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For the psychological sciences cultural processes have traditionally served as but a 
single entry into a considerable list of "phenomena under study." Until recent 
years, such study has not been richly realized. There are many reasons for the 
secondary role of a culturally focused psychology. Most prominently, there are 
two chief ways in which culture figures in the logic of psychological science, and 
neither of these favors a major professional investment. If one views cultures in 
terms of a field of differences, then culture largely serves the same scientific role 
as the study of personality, that is, as a moderator or qualifier for theoretical 
propositions of a more general scope. Thus, the vigorous scientist will propose a 
general theory (potentially true for all human organisms) of learning, motivation, 
memory, perception or the like, in which case cultural variations serve only to 
qualify the character of the process in varying contexts. Typically, because of the 
greater scientific stakes in documenting the general as opposed to the particular, 
cultural variations are either de-emphasized or simply bracketed for "later study." 
In the second mode of study, culture furnishes the proving ground for the 
universality of the general theory. Thus, for example, a host of investigators has 
sought to demonstrate the universality of emotional categories. On this model, 
culture itself is of secondary interest; cultural distinctiveness is but an impediment 
to achieving the broader goal of research. 
Although a sturdy and expanding band of psychologists have nevertheless 
generated volumes of research on cultural universals and variations (see for 
example, Berry et. al, 1992; Triandis and Berry, 1980), others have begun to 
explore the limits to the traditional view of psychology and culture. For example, 
some are drawn to a vision of a culturally sensitive psychology as a site for the 
study of the relationship between universal process and cultural rule systems (see 
for example, Eckensberger, 1994). Others see the primary task of the culturally 
concerned psychologist as elucidating processes of interculturation - how cultures 
conflict and reconfigure through interaction (see, for example, Denoux, 1992). 
Still others see the primary challenge as more practical in character. Rather than 
working toward abstract theoretical formulations, the culturally engaged 
psychologist might help to appraise various problems of health, environment, 
industrial development and the like in terms of the values, beliefs and motives 
particular to the culture at hand (see, for example, Moghaddam, 1987; Pandey, 
1988). Such efforts are useful in exploring the possibilities for a unique role for 
cross-cultural psychology, and draw special attention to the needs for more 
interpretive and more practical orientations to the research process. 
Interestingly, these deliberations on alternatives have not grown primarily out of 
North American soil. As many see it, they reflect the misgivings of myriad 
scholars in non-American, non-Western, and/or Third World locales, and 
particularly their doubts about the implicit presumption that 1) there is a 
universally acceptable conception of psychological science, and/or 2) all cultures 
should emulate psychology as practiced in North America. Such discontent has 
become increasingly vocal in recent years. For example, Sinha (1990) has 
questioned the predominance of "vertical collaboration," that is, of psychologists 
from developing countries working on research initiated by investigators in 
developed nations; he proposes "horizontal collaboration" among researchers 
working on practical problems across various regions of a country or with those in 
other developing nations. Moghaddam (1987) has outlined the attempt of many 
European psychologists to develop a psychology that is distinctively rooted in 
European culture. Kagitcibasi (1986) has pointed to the way in which Western 
individualism has important biasing effects on social psychological theory. Misra 
and Gergen (1993) have explored important limitations of North American 
theories and research practices when imported into the Indian cultural context. 
In the expression of such doubts, the profession of psychology is relatively 
conservative. As a contrast, in cultural anthropology there is enormous concern 
over the tendency of western anthropology to construct other cultures in terms 
saturated with western ideals and preconceptions, to exploit other cultures by 
using them for ends that are solely tied to local western interests, and colonizing 
other cultures through the exportation of western ideas, values and practices (see 
for example, Clifford, 1988; Fabian, 1983; Marcus, 1986). Similar discontents are 
manifest in various geographical area studies. For example, in his now classic 
work, Orientalism, Said (1978) proposes that research in "Oriental Studies" 
reflects the presumption of western superiority, and operates as a self-serving 
projection of the investigators'conceptions. 
There is much to be said for healthy dissent, and reflexive deliberation on the 
taken-for-granted assumptions of the profession. However, perhaps the most 
important test of the critical impulse is in terms of its capacity to generate 
alternative courses of action, to enrich the discipline and the world it serves in 
important ways. It is to this end that we direct the remainder of this offering. 
For many of us there is no more dramatic form of critical reflection than that 
stemming from an inversion of psychology's traditional subject-object dichotomy. 
That is, rather than privileging the psychologist as the scrutinizing subject for 
whom culture serves as the object of study, we find it most fully liberating to 
place culture in the vanguard. Let us begin with culture, as variously lived by each 
of us, and place psychology under scrutiny. In this case we may ask, in what 
degree and with what effects is psychological science itself a cultural 
manifestation? Beginning in this way, it is immediately apparent that the science 
is largely a byproduct of the western cultural tradition at a particular time in its 
historical development. Suppositions about the nature of knowledge, the character 
of objectivity, the place of value in the knowledge generating process, and the 
nature of linguistic representation, for example, all carry the stamp of a unique 
cultural tradition. Most interestingly, the character of psychological science is 
informed by a priori suppositions concerning the nature of human psychology 
itself (Gergen, 1994). That is, the science is based on certain assumptions 
concerning the psychological functioning of the individual scientist; without these 
assumptions the science as we know it would fail to be intelligible. It is presumed, 
for example, that the scientist possesses a conscious or observing mind, capable of 
reflecting and recording the nature of a world external to it; that the scientist 
possesses powers of inductive and deductive logic; and that the scientist also 
harbors motives and values that, without safeguards, can obscure observation and 
interfere with logical processes. All of these grounding assumptions are 
constituents of a western ethnopsychology (see Heelas and Lock, 1981). 
In what follows we wish to give fuller voice to specific cultural standpoints. 
Speaking from disparate cultural backgrounds and disparate histories of culturally 
sensitive study, we explore a range of problems provoked by the presumption of a 
universal science of psychology. However, rather than resting secure in critique, 
we also begin to explore the benefits for psychology when culture is given 
primacy. 
Toward Indigenous Indian Psychology (Girishwar Misra) 
The discipline of psychology as practiced in India is primarily based on the 
knowledge and know-how imported from the Euro-American tradition within the 
context of the more general exportation of Western knowledge and education (D. 
Sinha, 1986). As such Indian psychology began its journey by imitating the 
research problems, concepts, theories and methods borrowed from the research 
done in western countries. Being the recipient, it was subordinated to the donor 
country. The colonial condition of India led to gross neglect and avoidance of the 
Indian intellectual and cultural tradition central to the practices of the Indian 
people. The academic world maintained a distance from its cultural heritage and 
looked down at it with suspicion. The colonial incursion was so powerful that 
while western concepts were accepted and welcomed without scrutiny, indigenous 
concepts were denied entry to the academic discourse. Since the discipline was 
imitative, its growth remained always one step behind the developments in the 
donor country. 
Unlike the West, psychology in India did not grow as an integral part of the 
evolutionary process. Training by British or American psychologists coupled with 
the colonial influence produced a strong tendency in the academy to engage in a 
practice of culture blind psychology. Surprisingly enough this did not create 
discontent, as researchers were generally confident that they were contributing to 
the cumulatively growing pool of universal knowledge. Thus, deviations were 
treated as errors and the problems and issues were filtered through the scientific 
framework (Nandy, 1974) 
For a long period, psychology taught in the Indian universities was pure western 
psychology and attempts were made to safeguard it from the contaminating effects 
of Indian culture and thought. Its teaching maintained a strong universalistic 
stance. The research studied largely focused on testing the adequacy of western 
theories and concepts, wherein subjects provided objective behavioral data. In this 
scheme of scientific activity, culture was an irrelevant and extraneous intrusion. 
The current western thinking of the science of psychology in its prototypical form, 
despite being local and indigenous, assumed a global relevance, and was treated as 
a universal or pan-human mode of generating knowledge. Its dominant voice 
subscribes to a decontextualized vision with an extraordinary emphasis on 
individualism, mechanism, and objectivity. 
This peculiarly western mode of thinking is fabricated, projected and 
institutionalized through representational technologies and scientistic rituals, and 
transported on a large scale to the non-Western societies under politico-economic 
domination. As a result, western psychology tends to maintain an independent 
stance at the cost of ignoring other substantive possibilities from disparate cultural 
traditions. Mapping reality through Western constructs has offered a pseudo 
understanding of the peoples of alien cultures and has had debilitating effects in 
terms of misconstruing the special realities of other peoples, and exoticizing or 
disregarding psychologies that are non-Western. Consequently, when people from 
other cultures are exposed to western psychology they find their identities placed 
in question, and their conceptual repertoires rendered obsolete. 
For many of us, the universally projected modernist view of the individual as a 
self-determining and self-contained being is rapidly losing its functional value. In 
particular, post-modern conditions of massive cultural interchange invite us to 
think in terms of global coordination and cooperation. Sampson (1989) proposes 
that the western theory of the person has to be revised. To this end he proposes 
that the community not only describes a person's identity but constitutes it. In this 
framework persons are viewed as guardians of culturally based assets, and not 
their owners. Concomitantly, there is a resurgence of interest in approaching 
human action through more local modes of understanding, and issues of 
subjectivity, interpretation, and everyday understanding become increasingly 
salient. This shift signals the possibility of developing more culturally grounded 
and locally useful forms of knowledge. It goes beyond the positivist position and 
proposes that the knowledge claims in the human domain are relative to the 
setting in which they are developed. 
From this standpoint, we may see the person and the cultural context as mutually 
defining. Instead of searching for simple cause-effect relationships, a context-
dependent strategy is more desirable. The role of the academic psychologist might 
be better envisioned in terms of understanding, reading and interpreting cultural 
actions; sensitizing people to the potentialities of action within the existing range 
of intelligibilities; and inviting exploration into alternative forms of 
understanding. Innovative reconstructions of the academic toolbox are required; 
forms of language require attention, not as representations of underlying mental 
mechanisms but as culturally constituting actions. We must expand not only the 
repertoire of our analytical tools, but also add new dimensions to the theoretical 
and conceptual arena of the discipline. This also means active interchange with 
allied disciplines. This kind of participatory practice would be creative and 
emancipatory, acting so as to enrich and extend the cultural traditions. 
There are numerous signs of movement toward indigenous forms of psychology. 
At a metatheoretical level, Pranjpe (1984) has explored the possibility of relating 
and contrasting eastern and western concepts of self, identity and consciousness. 
Varma (in press) has approached the possibility of developing a social 
constructionist framework for psychology in India. Misra and Gergen (1993) have 
explored the possibility of articulating Indian (Hindu) construals of psychological 
functioning, with special emphasis on the spiritual and natural roots of the 
ontology of personhood. An indigenous psychology, from this standpoint, would 
emphasize: a holistic-organic worldview, coherence and order across all life 
forms, the socially constituted/embedded nature of the person, non-linear growth 
and continuity in life, behavior as transaction, the temporal and atemporal 
existence of human beings, spatio-temporally contextualized action, the search for 
eternity in life, the desirability of self-discipline, the transitory nature of human 
experience, distributed rather than personalized control, and a belief in multiple 
worlds (material and spiritual). 
In more pointed analyses, there has been increased questioning of western 
psychological constructs and methods for explicating and understanding Indian 
reality. These efforts to offer alternative construals have taken various forms, 
including theoretical and methodological innovations in social psychological, 
clinical and organizational contexts. A fruitful interface between indigenous 
Indian thought and psychological discourse is found in the Guru Chela paradigm 
of therapy (Neki, 1973), the nurturant task style of leadership (J.B.P. Sinha,1980), 
analyses of self and personality (Naidu, 1994; Tipathi, 1988), the 
reconceptualization of achievement (Misra and Agarwal, 1985: Dalai, Singh, and 
Misra, 1988), analyses of the Indian psyche (Kakar, 1978), emotion (Jain, 1994), 
justice (Krishnan, 1992), morality (Misra, 1991), the concept of well-being 
(D.Sinha, 1990), development (Kaur and Sarawsathi, 1992), values (Prakash, 
1994), detachment (N. Pande and Naidu, 1992), and methods of organizational 
intervention (Chakraporty, 1985). As Marriott (1992) has envisioned, these 
developments suggest,"that alternative social sciences are potentially available in 
the materials of many non-western cultures, and their development is essential to 
serve in the many places now either left to ad hoc descriptions or badly 
monopolized by social sciences borrowed from the West." (p.269) 
This move toward an indigenous Indian psychology does not imply an 
abandonment of the western tradition. The aim is not to generate a set of mutually 
exclusive, culturally based orientations that fail to regard or appreciate the 
alternatives; rather, there is an additional need to generate orientations that 
intersect and interpenetrate. Even three decades ago, Sinha (1962) indicated a 
need for an integration of modern psychology with Indian thought. Indian scholars 
have been drawn to this possibility by attempting to mix western and Indian 
concepts and to adapt western concepts to suit Indian culture. Whether western 
scholars can join in such a multi-world endeavor, so that a true dialogue ensues, 
remains to be seen. 
Psychology in the Maori Context (Andrew Lock) 
The practice of psychology in New Zealand, and particularly within the Maori 
context, cannot be understood without some grasp of history. The Maori are an 
indigenous people whose origins in the country can perhaps be traced back some 
3,000 years. A second group of people began to arrive some 300 years ago, and 
have sustained a post-Renaissance Indo-European culture that is generically 
termed "British." Largely because of their superior force of arms, and through a 
series of dubious political "agreements," the British gradually asserted their rule of 
the territories. Simultaneously, the Maori people have found themselves the 
victims of wide-ranging abuses, in which they have lost land, the rights to many of 
their traditional practices, and governance rights which they felt had been 
guaranteed by earlier agreements. They have increasingly been subjected to laws 
and regulations that either disregarded or actively interfered with traditions of 
longstanding. 
It has only been within the past few decades that a significant political force has 
been mounted in opposition to these incursions. Historically, there is no single 
Maori culture, as a recognizable, coherent unit; rather, there are many distinctive 
tribes each with its own local customs. However, largely for political purposes a 
vociferous "Maori" voice was developed to challenge the ever-encroaching British 
reign. Only in 1987 did the Maori language become an official language of State. 
State agencies have since developed mission statements in which they have 
committed themselves to observing certain Maori rights and customs. Yet, the 
nature of their policies is still very much an unknown; all cultural institutions are 
going through a process of re-inventing themselves. 
What are the implications of the above sketch for the contemporary practice of 
psychological science? Consider the reaction of Lawson-Te Aho (1993): 
psychology, and clinical psychology in particular, has created the mass 
abnormalization of Maori people by virtue of the fact that Maori people have been 
on the receiving end of psychological practice as the helpless recipients of 
(English) defined labels and treatments... Clinical psychology is a form of social 
control derived from human intent and human action and offers no more "truth" 
about the realities of Maori people's lives than a regular reading of the horoscope 
page in the local newspaper.(p.26) 
In effect, because psychology is seen by the Maori as an instrument devised by the 
dominant power, the profession is practiced in a highly politicized environment. 
There are three important consequences. First, because western psychology 
provides the instruments of assessment on which judgements are made, it is 
distrusted implicitly as a force in the continuation of suppression. Durie (l994) 
notes that Maori psychiatric admission rates are two or three times those of non-
Maori, and that there are no simple explanations for this. None-the-less the 
westerm diagnostic scales can be socially represented, grasped, and characterized 
by the Maori as part of the policing mechanisms of a post-colonial state. 
Second, recent developments in social psychology in the area of discourse and 
"social construction" have been seized on as of central importance for a practical 
contribution from the discipline (Potter and Wetherell, l987; Wetherell and Potter, 
l992). Discourse studies are seen as having strong potential for undermining the 
authority of the elites (Huygens, l993); studies of the discourse of the oppressed 
hold promise for challenging existing social relations (Essed, l988). Smith (l992), 
for example, outlines Maori discursive ideologies of education and language that 
have undergirded changes in the educational system; knowledge of the discourse 
of the disempowered brings it into contrasting relief with the discourse of the 
empowered and thereby both poses and enables a challenge to the status quo. 
Third, the politicized context of psychology serves to highlight the constructed 
nature of social life and institutions, such that in the hands of skilled workers, new 
and effective forms of practice can be established. Examples include the "Just 
Therapy" of Charles Waldegrave's group in Wellington (E.G.Waldegrave and 
Tapping, 1990) and David Epston's contribution to the development of "narrative 
therapy" (e.g., White and Epston, l990). 
In my view, the political polarization of the discipline is not merely derived from 
local relations of dominance and submission, but involves a clash of cultures. 
There is, here, a clash of values, of logics, and of conceived worlds and 
personhood; it is a difference in linguistic and other practices with 
incommensurate historical roots. "Personhood" in the two cultures cannot properly 
be equated. Superficially we might locate similarities, for example, in the 
conception of the mind-body relation, between the tinana and wairua. But these 
latter words are embedded in a complex web of cultural practices, and the direct 
translation of tinana as body, and wairua as mind, cannot be substantiated. The 
"map of the self" is different in each culture, and each culture could be said to 
require its own separate "psychological science." 
I have found coming to terms with this conclusion very difficult. In this case, the 
academic psychology of experimentation and measurement is not being 
challenged on epistemological grounds, nor on its constitution and interpretation 
of its data - its "truth status," if you like. These could be interesting discussions. 
Rather, academic and applied psychology are just deemed irrelevant. Why would 
a Maori want to measure intelligence, or sanity, for example? Western schools and 
western asylums are not the Maori way of education nor treatment for the 
troubled. As I confront this fact, great doubt suddenly opens up. At one time - not 
so long ago - western cultural institutions did not require such measures. What, 
after all, is the status of the measurements created by such scales? Intelligence as a 
concept has no purchase on an objective reality; it does not map anything in the 
"real" natural world: rather the concept of intelligence seems historically 
constituted to meet the challenges faced by western institutions in gaining control 
of their constituents (see, for example, Rose, 1990). These thoughts have been 
raised before, but as philosophical and social critiques grounded in a shared 
tradition of thought, rather than directly by a cultural tradition that defines a lived-
in human reality in which these "things" are irrelevant except as instruments of 
politically motivated suppression. 
If it is to have a future here, psychology has to be practical within its cultural 
context. This is not to say that the western tradition has nothing to offer. There 
are, for one, some approaches within contemporary western psychology that have 
simple instrumental utility. To appeal to an impeccable study such as Dan Slobin's 
Cross Linguistic Developmental Project (1985-1992) increases the chances of 
gaining funding for setting up Maori Language and Cultural Schools; it is high-
status research, and thus appeals to the governments of New Zealand. One could 
also teach developmental psychology, but because of its practical implications, 
more usefully from a Vygotskian perspective than a Piagetian one. In particular, 
the former admits the constitutive role of culture as an integral part of 
development rather than a background variable. One could teach social 
psychology as practical rhetoric, but as little else, for experimental social 
psychology is recognized by many scholars as a branch of an ideologically 
imbued system of thinking, value saturated, and imperialistic in ambitions. The 
"narrative" tradition is currently the most attractive candidate for the survival of 
(near) mainstream academic psychology (Sarbin, 1984). How to tell one's story 
effectively is a pressing problem in this country, not only in terms of sustaining 
prideful traditions but in the generation of a "level playing field." Further, such 
racial discourses also contribute importantly to a substantial data base in social 
psychology (as contained, for example, in the journal, Discourse and Society). 
Discourse studies are seen as committed to expressing the worlds of the unvoiced 
peoples. 
In part, the challenge of becoming a psychologist in New Zealand came from 
previous work, in which Paul Heelas and I, as editors, outlined a universal model 
of beliefs about the mind (Heelas and Lock, 1981). In one chapter of this volume, 
Jean Smith (1981) wrote on an exotic culture, the Maori, in which being a self was 
differently conceived. We as editors, however, felt the Maori view was 
"encompassable" within our science. We conceived of a universal "moral science" 
in which agents were aware of the responsibilities which their cultural categories 
constructed for them. This model may still have some validity. However, the 
challenge has turned out to be the validity of that validity, the morality of my 
morality, and the human use of my science. Once cannot simply do as George 
Miller once advocated - give psychology away - when the gift is an imposition, 
seen as an element in a policing process that denies the validity of a culture to 
determine its own ends. 
Bridge Over Troubled Waters: A Turkish Vision (Aydan Gulerce) 
In parallel to the global transformations taking place, psychology in Turkey is 
rapidly "developing." In large measure the profession has been following 
(sometimes blindly) the footsteps of so-called western (mainly American) 
psychology - with considerable delay. Ironically, it is not the strategies for 
defining the place of psychology in society and improving its prestige, that have 
been transported, so much as psychological technology and theoretical concepts. 
In spite of this generally unfortunate condition, a substantial number of pioneer 
psychologists in Turkey are transforming the psychological know-how acquired in 
western educational insitutions in order to meet the specific needs of the present 
sociocultural context. They have made substantial efforts to "think globally, act 
locally," recognizing the possibility of modernization without obliterating the 
local culture (see, for example, Kagitcibasi, 1986) 
At the same time, it would not be so difficult to conclude that American 
psychology has largely been "thinking locally, acting globally." The reader 
interested in the potentially damaging impact of western psychology in developing 
countries can consult with numerous writings by cross-cultural psychologists, 
including one in the Turkish context (Kagitcibasi, 1984), and a special issue of the 
International Journal of Psychology devoted to this topic (Sinha and Holtzman, 
l984). Much has already been written about the value-ladeness and other self-
induced constraints of contemporary psychological science. Not surprisingly, 
there are also many examples in which American psychology seems all too 
parochial when contrasted to the enduring characteristics of Turkish tradition (cf. 
Kagitcibasi, 1982; Oner, 1982). In my own inquiry into ethnopsychological 
conceptualizations of mental health (Gulerce, l990), child development (Gulerce, 
l992), and the family (Gulerce, l992), for example, evidence was provided for 
traditional moral, religious, and sociocultural values that differed or clashed with 
those implicit in American psychology (when checked against DSM-III, 
developmental psychology and contemporary family models). There was also 
evidence for the diffusion of a western ideology of individualism and related 
construals, indirectly (via cultural artifacts like media) or directly through 
psychological theories and practices (such as "assertiveness training"), in this 
socioculturally rich and dynamic society. 
To me, any attempt to "repair" or "replace" the western tradition, prior to 
considering its philosophical and methodological assumptions, along with its 
place in a world of practical affairs, would largely be useless. To be sure, cross-
cultural psychologists were quick to notice cultural "shortsightedness" of western 
psychology (see, for example, Berry, l990; Seagal et al, l990). In general, 
however, they have been unable to abandon mainstream scientism in general, 
remaining loyal to empiricism, and testing western theories with "culturally" 
(geographically) diverse data. In a similar vein, Turkish psychologists have been 
concerned particularly with the cultural/ecological validity of various research and 
application tools (see, for example Oner, l994; Savisir and Sahin, l985). Enormous 
energy has been invested in the adaptation and normalizing of western 
instruments. Clearly, the importation of measures, concepts and hypotheses 
involves a mutually supportive relationship with the diffusion of positivist-
empiricist conceptions of science. It is also unclear what injustice is done to local 
intelligibilities by the importation of western conceptions. When psychological 
terminology is translated into Turkish, the local language loses its richness of 
connotation along with its multiplicitous functioning in the society. It was not 
until recently that the conceptual validity of the western models or theories behind 
the technology were challenged and a "replacement" process begun (e.g., Gulerce, 
l992). 
It is in this respect that the indigenous psychology movement (e.g, Heelas and 
Lock, l981; Kim and Berry, l993), appears to offer good potential for making the 
discipline socioculturally relevant, and for constructing culturally valid and 
intelligible theories. Beyond being culturally appropriate, indigenous conceptions 
may in turn contribute to the revision of western theories. To illustrate the point 
with works from Turkey, Kagitcibasi (l985) demonstrated that "culture of 
separateness" and "culture of relatedness" appear compatible and interdependent 
in our society, and hence are not mutually the exclusive polarities assumed in 
western theorizing. Again, my own studies on the conceptualization of transitional 
phenomena (Gulerce, l99l) and the use of traditional objects (Gulerce, l99l), argue 
for the coexistent transformations towards both "individuation" and 
"connectedness," contradicting not only western theory, but classical assumptions 
about human development - such as unidirectionality, unilinearity, universalism, 
hierarchical and progressive order, etc. Additionally, many other theoretical 
assumptions relying on a view of rational, materialist, pragmatic, functionalist, 
self-centered, and self-contained human being fall short in application to 
understanding of much Turkish behavior. A guiding model is required which 
leaves room for the irrational, spiritual, altruistic, conservative, other-centered, 
community-oriented, and interdependent human being. 
At the same time, I do not feel content with the incorporation of "culture" into 
psychology at the level of theory alone. The indigenization of psychology still 
faces important challenges. Conceptual and operational definitions of culture, for 
example, are major sources of difficulty. Converting culture from "independent 
variable" to "index variable," drawing regional/commmunal boundaries, relying 
on group statistics - all at the expense of "private cultures" and local psychology - 
not only has the potential danger of generating a "sense of understanding" the 
other (lodged in one's local assumptions), but of creating new polarities. Further 
efforts at opening psychology to diverse traditions at all levels of inquiry, 
particularly in the areas of epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and praxis are much 
needed. 
At this point it is important to recognize that, just as there are psychologists in 
Turkey who are unwittingly more "American" than the American, there are 
psychologists living in the States who are also contributing importantly to the 
present discussion. Various programs have developed concurrently under the 
general headings of "cultural" and "cultural/historical" psychology to study 
culturally constituted processes (e.g., Cole, l990, 1992; Markus and Kitayama, 
l99l; Rogoff, 1990; Shweder, l990; Valsiner, 1989, 1991; Wertsch, 1991). Their 
studies of human processes in cultural contexts help in understanding and 
incorporating culture into psychology at a fundamental level. Similarly, we are 
provided with significant philosophical and historical critiques of psychology's 
strong commitments to foundationalism, empiricism, and the self-contained 
individual (see, for example, Danziger, 1990; Gergen, 1994; Jahoda, 1993; Sarbin, 
l989; Shotter, 1993).Such reflections help the discipline to realize its particular 
historical and cultural location. 
Taking advantage of my present location, looking from the bridge between East 
and West, literally and metaphorically, I believe we must press further toward an 
appreciation of differing philosophic traditions and in the direction of 
psychology's inter-culturation. Continuous consideration of the varied 
epistemological and metapsychological assumptions underlying and fertilizing 
mainstream spyshcology is necessary to soften the discipline's rigid boundaries. 
Equally important to me is the acceptance of novelty that enables creative growth 
and increases conceptual/ecological adequacy of knolwedge and its use around the 
globe (Gulerce, in press). Otherwise it is all too easy to see the situation in terms 
of western producers of psychological knowledge, as against non-western 
importers. Yet, in the long run this kind of dichotomous thinking is unproductive, 
and again, western (Cartesian) in origin. It seems further to sustain an "us vs. 
them" mentality, and thus inhibits the development of true dialogue among the 
cultures (to say nothing of dialogic methodology within the field itself). It may not 
only be arrogant (ironically, even in the search for solutions to "neo-
colonization"), but also epistemologically erroneous, to view the West 
independent of the rest. 
If the West has gained sufficient self-reflexivity to prevent further "patronizing," 
and the rest has gained sufficient self-assertion for "emancipation," we can hope 
for genuine intercultural interchange. In my view, a strong commitment to any 
particular epistemology and methodology is unproductive. It is my specific hope 
that we might move together toward a discipline that would enable us to "live 
together more comfortably (with)in the universe" as opposed to "gaining control 
over" it. Needless to say, the capacity for diversity and pluralism, a tolerance for 
ambiguity and the unknown, and an acceptance of - and peace with - limitations in 
the quest for knowledge are not well developed western qualities. Alternative 
philosophical positions, I believe, would help to prevent psychological science 
from anxious reductionisms (as in behaviorism and cognitivism) and from 
superficial and/or conceptually flawed constructions of human reality (as in 
pragmatism and rationalism). Perhaps they would encourage what for the world 
might be a "better" or more humane psychological science. 
I am sometimes optimistic about the possibilities of inter-cultural dialogue - 
particularly as western psychology becomes less isolated. However, it sometimes 
appears that American psychologists are too busy with their own quantitative 
reproductions that they cannot find time even for reading each other's work, much 
less conceptually unsettling contributions from abroad. And, I fear, the enormous 
production of data in the United States is seldom applicable even to local social 
problems, to say nothing of the problems confronting other cultures. We see an 
enormous "waste" of material and human resources, creating not knowledge but 
largely irrelevant information. 
In Speaking Together 
Although these commentaries were generated independently, and in highly diverse 
cultural contexts, we find the extent of our agreement striking. And, in spite of our 
shared misgivings regarding traditional practices, we find common grounds for 
what we believe could be a particularly fruitful range of inter-cultural dialogues. 
For entry into such dialogue, it is first essential that no single paradigm of 
psychological inquiry be granted preeminence. This is at once to honor the many 
traditions of western psychology - empiricist, phenomenological, critical school, 
feminist, hermeneutic, social constructionist, and more - as well as those extant in 
other cultural traditions. At the same time, it is to invite a certain humility. Should 
practitioners fail to appreciate the limitations necessarily inherent in their local 
paradigms, and treat the alternatives as flawed inferiors, currently existing 
conflicts will not give way to productive dialogue. 
With dialogue configured in this way, we see the various cultures of the world 
offering to each other an enormously rich array of resources. These include 
multiple 1) conceptions of knowledge (metatheory), 2) discourses of human 
functioning (indigenous theory), 3) culturally located descriptions of action 
(research outcomes), and 4) professional practices (e.g. therapy, counseling, 
meditation, mediation). In effect, the richly variegated traditions must be explored, 
articulated and celebrated for the range of resources they can bring to the practice 
of psychology as a global cooperative. In our view, the most positive forms of 
professional interchange occur, not when one attempts to improve or englighten 
the other, but when the fascinating, the novel and the practical from one context 
are made available for others to appropriate selectively as their local 
circumstances invite. It is to the practical means of achieving such dialogue that 
attention is now required. 
By placing culture in the vanguard of our concerns, we are finally drawn to the 
enormous global need for a psychology of practical significance. Western 
psychology has had the luxury of devoting most of its research to questions of 
abstract theory, and viewing application as a second-rate derivative. However, not 
only do we find such theories largely parochial (even when purporting 
universality), but very little of the research has practical payoff. Expenditures on 
behalf of abstract theory testing seem largely wasted. In contrast, culturally 
sensitive research into people's behavior in such domains as health (e.g. trust in 
medicine, safe sex), birth control, child abuse, drug addiction, ethnic and religious 
conflict, and the effects of technology on society are in desparate need. This is not 
to abandon abstract theory. However, in a world of extended hardship, the chief 
function of such theory may be that of constructing intelligible futures. Alternative 
conceptions of the person invite alternative modes of action, new institutions, and 
new policies. In effect, theory becomes a practical device for constructing the 
future. 
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Footnote  
* Requests for reprints should be sent to Dr. Kenneth Gergen, Department of 
Psychology, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA. 19081, USA. 
It is slowly being realized that psychological processes are rooted in historically 
variable and culturally mediated practical activities. People construct multiple 
socio-historically grounded realities; apprehending reality from an observer-
independent perspective is not possible. A cultural emphasis underscores the 
constitutive role of the social context of understanding. We as human beings 
operate within socially constituted worlds. From this orientation the assumptions 
of a lawful universe of human conduct and absolute objects with context-free 
properties are misleading. Investigations from a culturally rooted perspective tend 
to show that many western concepts lack experiential grounding in other cultures. 
They offer evidence that presumed universal and identical psychological 
phenomena or processes (e.g. self, emotion, morality, well-being, development) 
are not viable. Instead, the character of human action is constituted differently in 
varying socio-cultural contexts. 
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